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Abstract. NTRUEncrypt is a fast and practical lattice-based public-key
encryption scheme, which has been standardized by IEEE, but until re-
cently, its security analysis relied only on heuristic arguments. Recently,
Stehlé and Steinfeld showed that a slight variant (that we call pNE) could
be proven to be secure under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA), assum-
ing the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices. We present a
variant of pNE called NTRUCCA, that is IND-CCA2 secure in the standard
model assuming the hardness of worst-case problems in ideal lattices,
and only incurs a constant factor overhead in ciphertext and key length
over the pNE scheme. To our knowledge, our result gives the first IND-
CCA2 secure variant of NTRUEncrypt in the standard model, based on
standard cryptographic assumptions.
As an intermediate step, we present a construction for an All-But-One
(ABO) lossy trapdoor function from pNE, which may be of independent
interest. Our scheme uses the lossy trapdoor function framework of Peik-
ert and Waters, which we generalize to the case of (k−1)-of-k-correlated
input distributions.
Keywords. Chosen-Ciphertext Security, Lossy Trapdoor Function, Lattice-
based cryptography, NTRU, ideal lattice, provable security.
? This work was done while the first author was with Macquarie University.
1 Introduction
Background. It is now widely recognized that most practical applications of
public-key cryptosystems require more than the basic passive security against
chosen-plaintext eavesdropping attacks (known as IND-CPA security). The de
facto standard requirement that suffices for the majority of applications is secu-
rity against chosen-ciphertext attacks, known as IND-CCA2 security[28].
With the recent development of lattice-based cryptography, a public-
key cryptosystem with public-key length O(n2 log2 n) and ciphertext length
O(n log2 n) (for security parameter n) was given by Regev [29], having IND-
CPA security provably based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem,
which in turn was shown to be as hard as the quantum worst-case hardness of
standard lattice problems. A `dual' variant system with similar complexity was
later proposed in [11]. The large quadratic factor n2 in the public-key length is
due to the unstructured matrices used in the LWE problem. By moving to a
structured matrix (first proposed for lattice-based hash functions in [20, 17, 25]),
it was shown independently and concurrently in [33] and [19] how one could
construct variants of Regev's cryptosystem based on the Ring-LWE problem (a
variant of LWE over rings of cyclotomic number fields) with IND-CPA security
provably based on the quantum worst-case hardness of lattice problems over the
class of structured lattices called ideal lattices. The corresponding structured
matrices allow the public-key length to be reduced to O(n log n) (as well as the
encryption and decryption complexity, by using FFT techniques).
While the above systems are supported by theoretically sound proofs of se-
curity, the most practical and efficient lattice-based cryptosystem to date has
been the NTRU encryption scheme, proposed in 1996 [7]. The scheme, now known
as NTRUEncrypt, has been suggested as one of the most practical public-key en-
cryption scheme with conjectured `post-quantum' security (see, e.g., [27]). Its
practicality is also evidenced by its industrial standardization by the IEEE [15].
However, until recently, the security of NTRUEncrypt has only been analyzed
heuristically. But recently, Stehlé and Steinfeld [34] showed that a slight vari-
ant of NTRUEncrypt(that we call pNE) can be shown to achieve IND-CPA secu-
rity based on worst-case lattice problems over ideal lattices. Unfortunately, the
pNE scheme (like the original NTRUEncrypt scheme) is trivially insecure against
chosen-ciphertext attacks, due to its homomorphic properties.
Our Results. The practicality and standardization of the NTRUEncrypt scheme
on the one hand, together with the recent result of [34] on the passive (IND-CPA)
security of a slight variant of NTRUEncrypt, raise the natural question of whether
NTRUEncrypt can be adapted efficiently to achieve IND-CCA2 security in the
standard model, while preserving the strong security guarantees of [34] based on
the worst-case hardness of lattice problems in ideal lattices. In this paper, we
answer this question affirmatively, in the asymptotic sense. We present a vari-
ant of NTRUEncrypt called NTRUCCA, that is IND-CCA2 secure in the standard
model assuming the worst-case quantum hardness of problems in ideal lattices,
and only incurs a constant factor overhead in ciphertext and key length over the
pNE variant shown to be IND-CPA in [34]. Namely, our scheme still enjoys a key
and ciphertext length and encryption/decryption computation costs quasi-linear
in the security parameter, given the best known attacks. To our knowledge, our
scheme is the first efficient variant of NTRUEncrypt achieving IND-CCA2 secu-
rity based on standard cryptographic assumptions. We emphasize that our aim
is here is to show the asymptotic feasibility of obtaining an efficient IND-CCA2
NTRUEncrypt variant from standard cryptographic assumptions, and we leave it
to future work to reduce the constant factor overhead incurred by our construc-
tion, as well as the overhead incurred by the pNE scheme of [34] over the original
NTRUEncrypt scheme.
As an intermediate step, we present a construction for an All-But-One (ABO)
lossy trapdoor function from pNE, which may be of independent interest. The
public key of our ABO function consists of just one NTRU public-key and one
NTRU ciphertext, while our function output is a single NTRU ciphertext. As part
of our ABO construction, using the results of [32] on a variant of the NTRUSign
signature scheme, we also present a variant of pNE, preserving its security re-
duction, but with full randomness recovery during decryption (i.e. the random-
ness used in encryption is recovered during decryption along with the message,
whereas in the pNE scheme from [34], only the message is recovered in decryp-
tion). Our NTRUCCA scheme is built from our ABO lossy trapdoor function by
using a generalization of the generic Peikert-Waters construction of IND-CCA2
encryption from ABO lossy trapdoor functions. This generalization, which may
be of independent interest, is required since our pNE-based ABO does not have
a sufficient lossiness to be used within the generic IND-CCA2 construction of
Peikert and Waters [26]. Our generalized construction uses (k−1)-of-k-correlated
input distributions (used also in [22]) to weaken the lossiness requirement from
the ABO sufficiently to allow us to use it.
Related Work. The first construction of a cryptosystem with IND-CCA2 secu-
rity provably based on worst-case lattice problems (in the standard model) was
given by Peikert and Waters [26]. Their general framework, which also forms the
basis for our result, was a construction of IND-CCA2 secure encryption from a
primitive called a lossy ABO trapdoor function family, along with a one-time
signature scheme. They then showed how to construct a lossy ABO family from
the LWE problem (and hence from worst-case lattice problems). The resulting
IND-CCA2 scheme, however, has quadratic complexity Ω(n2) in the security pa-
rameter n due to the use of the LWE problem in the underlying ABO, rather than
the structured Ring-LWE problem. While the ABO construction of [26] could be
applied in the Ring-LWE setting to obtain a quasi-linear complexity in n (like
the complexity of our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO in this paper), the lossiness of
the construction is based on non-square Ring-LWE matrices (having at least
two ring elements), and is not directly applicable to our NTRUEncrypt setting
in which the Ring-LWE matrix is square and consists of a single ring element.
Instead, we show how to use a `masking' based approach to provide lossiness in
our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO (see Sec. 3 for more details).
Rosen and Segev [30] gave another general construction for an IND-CCA2
secure scheme inspired by Peikert and Waters [26], but starting from a weaker
primitive called a correlation-secure trapdoor function family (which can be
constructed from a lossy trapdoor function family). Subsequently, Peikert [24]
showed how to construct a correlation-secure trapdoor function family from the
LWE problem, and used it within the Rosen-Segev scheme, to obtain another
lattice-based IND-CCA2 secure scheme. Unfortunately, the latter scheme suffers
from long public-key and ciphertext length of Ω(n2) in the security parameter
n, even if applied in the Ring-LWE setting.
More constructions of IND-CCA2 secure lattice-based encryption schemes
can be obtained by using the lattice-based selective-ID secure IBE schemes of [1,
2] within the generic construction of [5], and a one-time signature or commitment
scheme. Until very recently, it was unknown how to instantiate the most efficient
scheme from [1] based on Ring-LWE with a poly-time reduction from worst-
case problems in ideal lattices, but this has now been resolved by Langlois and
Stehlé [16], who show the hardness of decision Ring-LWE for any modulus q.
A similar and more efficient (in terms of constant factors) system follows by
adapting the recent techniques of [21] to the Ring-LWE setting. Thus several
candidates now exist, besides our NTRU-based scheme, for efficient IND-CCA2
encryption based on Ring-LWE. We leave it to future work to optimize and
compare the concrete performance of all these schemes.
The `masking' approach we use for constructing our NTRUEncrypt based ABO
is similar to that used in constructions of lossy functions in [9] based on clas-
sical number-theoretic assumptions; our construction shows how to extend this
approach to the NTRUEncrypt setting. Our use of a (k− 1)-of-k correlated input
distribution in our IND-CCA2 scheme is similar to a technique used by Mol
and Yilek [22] to improve the Rosen-Segev [30] construction. Our generalized
Peikert-Waters construction offers efficiency gains by a factor linear in the secu-
rity parameter, when one starts from an ABO lossy function losing a constant
fraction of its input entropy (such as our NTRUEncrypt-based ABO function).
Note that this paper focuses exclusively on the standard model. If one is
willing to use hash functions modeled as random oracles [3], then one can obtain
efficient IND-CCA2 secure variants of NTRUEncrypt by generic transformations
from IND-CPA secure cryptosystems [10], or by using more optimized variants
tailored for NTRUEncrypt [23, 14, 31]. However, in practice, when the random
oracle is instantiated with a public cryptographic hash function, one does not
obtain any security guarantees for the resulting scheme from standard crypto-
graphic assumptions.
Due to space limitations, we have omitted some proofs in this version of the
paper. They can be found in the full version, on the authors' web page.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We assume throughout this paper that n is a power of 2, and q is a prime such
that xn + 1 splits into n linear factors modulo q (i.e. 2n divides q − 1), and we
denote by R and Rq the rings Z[x]/(xn+1) and Zq[x]/(xn+1), respectively, and
by K the field Q[x]/(xn + 1). The set of invertible elements of Rq is denoted by
R×q . We use the asymptotic notations O(·), O˜(·), o(·), ω(·), Ω(·), Ω˜(·), Θ(·). We
let U(D) denote the uniform distribution over domain D.
2.2 Lattice Background
A lattice is a set of the form L =
∑
i≤n Zbi, where the bi's are linearly indepen-
dent vectors in Rn. The integer n is called the lattice dimension, and the bi's are
called a basis of L. The minimum λ1(L) is the Euclidean norm of any shortest
non-zero vector of L. A lattice L is called ideal if it consists of the set of coeffi-
cient vectors of the elements in an ideal of the ring R. The γ-Ideal-SVP(IdSVP)
problem is, given a basis for an ideal lattice L, to compute a non-zero vector in
L whose norm is at most γλ1(L).
For a lattice L and a deviation parameter σ > 0, we denote by DL,σ the dis-
crete Gaussian probability distribution on L, defined by DL,σ(x) = ρσ(x)/ρ(L),
where ρσ(x) = exp(−pi‖x‖2/σ2). We denote by χα a certain discrete `Gaussian-
like' distribution (denoted Γ¯α in [34]) on ring R, which is used in [19] as the error
distribution for the Ring-LWE problem in order to allow a security reduction
from the γ-Ideal-SVP problem. The precise definition of this distribution is quite
technical (we refer to [34] and [19] for more details). For the purposes of this
paper, it suffices to know that χα can be sampled efficiently (in expected time
O˜(n)) and samples from it have small norm. Here we need a stronger version of
this Lemma that applies for all r ∈ Rp, rather than just for one fixed r.
Lemma 1 (Adapted from [32]). For y sampled from χα, we have:
Pr
[
∃r ∈ Rp such that ‖yr‖∞ ≥ p · ω(n
√
log n) · αq
]
≤ n−ω(1)
and
Pr
[∃r ∈ Rp such that ‖yr‖∞ ≥ p · n1.5 · αq] ≤ 2−Ω(n).
For s ∈ Rq, let As,χα denote the distribution on Rq×Rq, where a sample from
As,χα consists of a pair (a, y) with a independently and uniformly distributed
in R×q and y = a · s+ e with e independently sampled from χα. The Ring-LWE
problem R-LWEα,q (denoted by R-LWE
×
HNF in [34]) is the following: Let s ∈ Rq
be sampled from χα. Given an oracle O that produces samples in Rq × Rq,
distinguish whether O outputs samples from the distribution As,χα or from the
uniform distribution on R×q ×Rq.
Theorem 1 (Adapted from [19]). Assume that αq = ω(n
√
log n) (resp.
Ω(n1.5)) with α ∈ (0, 1) and q = Poly(n). There exists a randomized polynomial-
time (resp. subexponential) quantum reduction from γ-Ideal-SVP to R-LWEq,α,
with γ = ω(n1.5 log n)/α (resp. Ω(n2.5)/α).
We recall the scheme pNE, the provably secure variant of NTRUEncrypt, with pa-
rameters n, q, p, α, σ [34]. pNE differs from the original NTRUEncrypt [13] in several
Key generation.
• Sample f from DZn,σ; let f = p · f ′ + 1; if (f mod q) 6∈ R×q , resample.
• Sample g from DZn,σ; if (g mod q) 6∈ R×q , resample.
• Return secret key sk = f ∈ R×q and public key pk = h = g/f ∈ R×q .
Encryption. Given message M ∈ Rp, set s, e ←↩ χα and return ciphertext
C = p · (hs+ e) +M ∈ Rq.
Decryption. Given ciphertext C and secret key f , compute C ′ = f · C ∈ Rq
and return message M = C ′ mod p.
Fig. 1. The encryption scheme pNE(n, q, p, σ, α).
minor aspects: the choice of ring R = Z[x]/(xn + 1) (versus R = Z[x]/(xn − 1)),
the choice of q prime (versus q a power of 2), the choice of distributions for f, g as
restricted discrete Gaussians (versus sparse binary polynomials), and the extra
error term pe in encryption C = phs+ pe+M (versus C = phs+M).
We will need a variant of pNE with message space B a large subset of Rp =
Zp[x]/(xn + 1) such that b1 − b2 is invertible in Rp for all b1 6= b2 in B. If
xn+1 =
∏r
i=1 fi mod p denotes the factorization of x
n+1 into irreducibles fi over
Zp, then by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, a polynomial b ∈ Zp[x]/(xn + 1)
is invertible in Rp if and only if it is coprime to fi over Zp for all i = 1, . . . , r.
The following lemma shows how to choose p such that r = 2 and f1, f2 are both
irreducibles of degree n/2. This allows us to take B = {b ∈ Rp : deg(b) < n/2}.
Lemma 2 ([4]). If n = 2k with k ≥ 2 and p is a prime with p ≡ 3 mod 8,
then xn + 1 = f1f2 mod p where each fi is irreducible in Zp[x] and can be
written fi = x
n/2 + tix
n/4 − 1 with ti ∈ Zp.
Our generalized Peikert-Waters construction of IND-CCA2 encryption from
lossy trapdoor functions uses the following Generalized Leftover Hash lemma.
Lemma 3 ([8]). Suppose that random variable X on {0, 1}n has min-entropy
`x and random variable Y (that may depend on X) has at most 2
`y possible
values. Let H be a family of universal hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}`
with `x − (`y + `) ≥ 2 log 1/ for some  > 0. Then the statistical distance
between (h, h(X), Y ) (for h chosen uniformly from H) and (h, r, Y ) (for h chosen
uniformly from H and r chosen uniformly and independently from {0, 1}`) is at
most .
2.3 ABO Lossy Trapdoor Functions
We recall the definition of ABO Lossy Trapdoor Functions [26].
Definition 1. An ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function Family F = (KGF ,F,F−1) is
a collection of three polynomial time algorithms:
 Key Generation algorithm KGF : On input 1n (for a security parameter
n ∈ N), and a lossy branch b∗ ∈ B (B denotes the branch space), the
probabilistic algorithm KGF outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
 Evaluation algorithm F: On input public key pk, x ∈ X (X denotes
the function input space) and branch b ∈ B, the deterministic algorithm F
returns an output y = F(pk, b, x) ∈ Y (where Y denotes the output space).
 Inversion algorithm F−1: On input y ∈ Y , b ∈ B and secret key sk, the
deterministic algorithm F−1 returns x = F−1(sk, b, y) ∈ X ∪ {⊥} (where ⊥
indicates an inversion failure).
These algorithms satisfy the following properties, for some parameters δ ∈ (0, 1)
(failure probability) and ρ ∈ (0, 1) (lossiness leakage rate):
 δ-Inversion Correctness: For any b∗ ∈ B, except with negligible prob-
ability ≤ δ over the key pair (sk, pk) output by KGF (n, b∗), we have
F−1(sk, b,F(pk, b, x)) = x for all x ∈ X and b ∈ B \ {b∗}.
 ρ-Lossiness (with failure probability δ): For any b∗ ∈ B, except with
negligible probability ≤ δ over the key pair (sk, pk) output by KGF (n, b∗), the
size of the image set {y ∈ Y : ∃x ∈ X with y = F(pk, b∗, x)} is at most |X|ρ.
 (T, ) Lossy Branch Hiding: The advantage of any T -time (for T =
Poly(n)) attacker A in distinguishing between the following two experiments
Exp(0) and Exp(1) is a negligible function  of the security parameter n.
For i ∈ {0, 1}, the experiment Exp(i) is defined as follows. On input 1n, A
outputs a pair of branches b∗0, b
∗
1 ∈ B. Then KGF is run on input (1n, b∗i ),
returning a key pair (pk, sk), and A is given pk.
Remark 1. In our definition of ρ-lossiness, ρ is an upper bound on the
leakage rate of the lossy branch, i.e. the fraction of the input min-entropy that
is leaked by the output.
3 An ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function from pNE
3.1 Modifying pNE for Full Randomness Recovery in Decryption
The decryption algorithm for the provable NTRUEncrypt variant pNE from [34]
only recovers the encrypted message M but not the randomness (s, e) used to
encrypt M . For constructing the ABO trapdoor function that is used in our
NTRUCCA scheme, we need an additional randomness recovery algorithm that can
also recover the randomness (s, e). In this section, we show how to modify the
scheme pNE to achieve this, while preserving its security reduction. It turns out
that most of the tools we need in this section have been worked out in [32] for
the purpose of analyzing the NTRUSign signature scheme, and we only need to
slightly tweak them for our application.
Our main observation for constructing a randomness recovery algorithm for
pNE is that, after M is recovered by the decryption algorithm and C ′ = p−1 ·
(C −M) = h · s+ e is computed, we have:[
C ′
0
]
=
[
h
−1
]
· s+
[
e
s
]
.
The vector c = [C ′, 0]T ∈ R2q is in the form of an (Ring) LWE instance c = A·s+e
over the ring Rq, where A = [h,−1]T ∈ R2×1q and e = [e, s]T ∈ R2 is `small'.
Thus, given a full trapdoor matrix T ∈ R2×2 for the matrix A over R, (i.e. the
entries of T have `small' coefficients, T · A = 0 mod q and T has full rank over
the field K = Q[x]/(xn + 1)), the randomness e can be recovered by standard
techniques for LWE inversion [11, 24, 33], namely one can compute T ·c mod q =
T · e mod q = Te, where the last equality holds over K, since ‖T · e‖∞ < q/2
when ‖T‖ and e are sufficiently small. Since T has full rank over K, T−1 exists
over K, and e can be recovered from e = T−1 · (T ·c mod q). Note that since the
secret key polynomials f, g satisfy f ·h−g = 0 mod q, the vector [f, g]T can serve
as the first row of the trapdoor matrix T . In designing their signature scheme,
the NTRUSign authors [12] give a heuristic algorithm to compute another small
pair (F,G) ∈ R2 such that F · h − G mod q, which is linearly independent of
[f, g] over K. A variant of this algorithm, that we call TrapKG, is presented and
analyzed rigorously in [32]. In [32], the algorithm TrapKG is applied for obtaining
a provably secure variant of NTRUSign. Here, we apply it to obtain a provably
secure variant of pNE with full randomness recovery. For our application, one does
not need to store the full trapdoor matrix T . Indeed, from the above description
of the decryption process, it is clear that one need only store (f, F ) and a low
precision approximation T˜ to T−1 The algorithm TrapKG is shown in Fig. 2. To
Inputs: n, q, p ∈ Z, σ, η ∈ R.
Output: A key pair (sk, pk).
1. Sample f ′ from DZn,σ; if (f mod q) 6∈ R×q or (f mod p) 6∈ R×p , resample.
2. Sample g from DZn,σ; if (g mod q) 6∈ R×q , resample.
3. If ‖f‖ > √n · σ or ‖g‖ > √n · σ, restart.
4. If ideal 〈f, g〉 6= R, restart.
5. Compute F1, G1 ∈ R such that fG1 − gF1 = 1; Fq := qF1, Gq := qG1.
6. Use Babai's nearest plane algorithm to approximate (Fq, Gq) by an integer
linear combination of (f, g), (xf, xg), . . . , (xn−1f, xn−1g).
Let (F,G) ∈ R2 be the output with (F,G) = (Fq, Gq)− k(f, g) and k ∈ R.
7. If ‖(F,G)‖ > nσ, restart.
8. Compute T =
[
f g
F G
]
.
9. Compute T˜ ∈ K2×2, an approximation to T−1 (over K) with precision η.
(i.e. the entries of matrix T˜ − T−1 have infinity norm at most η).
10. Return secret key sk = (f, F, T˜ ), pk = h
def
= g/f ∈ R×q .
Fig. 2. Full Trapdoor Key Generation Algorithm TrapKG (adapted from [32]).
obtain a high efficiency for our NTRUCCA scheme, we will choose p = nθ(1), versus
the choice p = O(1) used in pNE. To obtain a tighter security reduction with this
choice, we dropped the restriction f = 1 mod p used in pNE. Instead, we sample
f from a Gaussian (as in the NTRUSign variant of [32]), but here we must reject
and resample f if it is not invertible mod q or mod p.
Lemma 4 (Adapted from Lemma 4.1 in [32]). Let n ≥ 8, q ≥ 5 and
p = 3 mod 8. Let σ ≥√n ln(2n(1 + 1/δ))/pi · q1/2, for an arbitrary δ ∈ (0, 1/2).
Let a ∈ R and p ∈ R×q . Then Prf←↩DZn,σ [f 6∈ R×q ∩ R×p ] ≤ n(1/q + 2δ) + 2 ·
(1/qn/2 + 2δ).
The algorithm TrapKG in Fig. 2 differs from the NTRUSign key generation
algorithm analyzed in [32] only in the extra rejection step for f if f 6∈ Rp. Using
the above Lemma 4 (in place of Lemma 4.1 of [32]) to evaluate the rejection
probability in the proof of Lemma 4.4 of [32] gives the following performance
result for this algorithm.
Theorem 2 (Adapted from [32], Th. 4.2). Suppose q ≥ 256n and p is
a prime with p = 3 mod 8. Let ε ∈ (0, 1/2) and σ ≥ max(2n√ln(8nq) ·
q
1
2 +2ε, ω(n1.5 log5 n)). Then the algorithm of Fig. 2 terminates in expected poly-
nomial time, and T · [h,−1]T = 0 mod q. Furthermore, we have ‖f‖, ‖g‖ ≤ √nσ
and ‖F‖, ‖G‖ ≤ nσ. Finally, if n is sufficiently large, the distribution of the re-
turned h is rejected with probability c < 1 for some absolute constant c from a
distribution whose statistical distance from U(R×q ) is ≤ 23nq−bεnc.
Our pNE variant with randomness recovery, called pNErr, is shown in Fig. 3.
The decryption algorithm for pNErr requires an additional multiplication by
f−1p mod p during decryption (versus pNE) since in pNErr we have dropped the
restriction f = 1 mod p.
Key generation. Given input parameters (n, q, p, σ, η), run algorithm TrapKG
of Fig. 2 on input (n, q, p, σ, η) and return sk = (f, F, T˜ ), pk = h
def
= g/f ∈ R×q .
Encryption. Given message M ∈ P, set s, e ←↩ χα and return ciphertext
C = p · (hs+ e) +M ∈ Rq.
Decryption. Given ciphertext C and secret key (f, F, T˜ ), compute C ′ = f ·C ∈
Rq and return messageM = f
−1
p C
′ mod p, where f−1p denotes the multiplicative
inverse of f in Rp.
Randomness Recovery. Given ciphertext C, message M and secret
key (f, F, T˜ ), compute C ′ = p−1 · (C − M) ∈ Rq, te = fC ′ ∈ Rq and
ts = FC
′ ∈ Rq, and [e, s]T = dT˜ · [te, ts]T c ∈ R2, where d·c denotes round-
ing coordinate-wise to the nearest integers. Return (s, e).
Fig. 3. The encryption scheme pNErr(n, q, p, σ, α, η).
Conditions on the scheme parameters that guarantee correctness of decryp-
tion and randomness recovery are summarized in the following Lemma. Note
that we gain a factor ‖p‖ over the bounds in [32] due to dropping the condition
f = 1 mod p.
Lemma 5. If ω(
√
n log n)αpσ < 1, the decryption algorithm of pNErr recov-
ers M with probability 1 − n−ω(1) over the choice of s, e, f, g. If the conditions
ω(n log n)ασ < 1 and η < 1mnq hold, then the randomness recovery algorithm of
pNErr recovers (s, e) with probability 1− n−ω(1) over the choice of s, e, f, g.
As in [32], the security of the scheme follows from the invertibility of p in Rq,
and the hardness of the decisional Ring LWE problem in Rq with h uniform in
R×q . Here we also have to deal with the additional fact that h is sampled from
a distribution that is rejected with constant probability from an almost uniform
distribution on R×q (by Theorem 2).
Lemma 6. Suppose q ≥ 256n and p ∈ R×q is a prime with p = 3 mod 8. Let ε ∈
(0, 1/2) and σ ≥ max(2n√ln(8nq)·q 12 +2ε, ω(n1.5 log5 n)). If there exists an IND-
CPA attack against pNErr that runs in time T and has success probability 1/2+δ,
then there exists an algorithm solving R-LWEα,q that runs in time T
′ = O(n ·
δ¯−2 · T ) and has advantage δ′ ≥ δ¯2/4 − 2−Ω(n), where δ¯ = (1 − c) · δ − q−Ω(n)
and c < 1 is the rejection constant from Theorem 2.
3.2 Our ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function
Outline. We now use the pNErr scheme to construct an ABO Lossy Trapdoor
function. Our construction uses as a starting point the paradigm underlying the
constructions presented in [26]. In this paradigm, one starts with an encryption
scheme E that is homomorphic with respect to addition and multiplication by
known messages, i.e. given a ciphertext c = E(b) for message b, and two messages
b1 and b2, then c
′ = b1 ·E(b) + b2 is a ciphertext for the message b′ = b1 · b+ b2.
Given such an encryption scheme E, for a desired lossy branch b∗, the ABO key
generation algorithm computes ciphertext pk = E(b∗) as the public key (with
the decryption key as the trapdoor), and on input a message x and branch b, the
function evaluation algorithm computes F (pk, b, x) = x·(pk−b) = x·E(b∗−b) =
E(x · (b∗ − b)). Thus, when evaluating F on the lossy branch (b = b∗), we
just have F (pk, b, x) = E(0), a ciphertext of a zero message independent of
x, and we may hope that F (pk, b∗, x) indeed loses at least some information
on x, whereas for b 6= b∗, we have F (pk, b, x) = E(x · (b∗ − b)), which allows
recovery of x if the mapping x 7→ (b∗ − b) · x is injective. Unfortunately, this
idea does not immediately work for pNErr. On the positive side, the pNErr
scheme has the desired homomorphic properties. Namely, given a ciphertext
c = h · s+ pe+M ∈ Rq for a message M ∈ Rp and two messages M1,M2 ∈ Rp,
we have that M1 · c + M2 = h · (M1s) + p(M1e) + (M1M + M2) is a valid
ciphertext for M1M +M2 mod p, assuming that M1s and M1e are chosen small
enough compared to q. The problem is that the resulting function evaluated on a
lossy branch i.e. y = F (pk, b∗, x) = x · (pk− b) = x · (hs+pe), is not lossy, indeed
it is injective with high probability. This is because pk − b may be invertible in
Rq, and even if it is not, one can recover x with high probability from x · s and
x·e, where the latter two can be recovered from y = x·(hs+pe) = h·(xs)+p(xe)
and h using the randomness recovery algorithm of pNErr.
Our solution to the lossiness problem of the above construction uses the ob-
servation that pNErr is in fact additively homomorphic with respect to addition
of two ciphertexts, not just with respect to addition of a known message to
a ciphertext, i.e. given ciphertexts E(b1) and E(b2) for messages b1, b2 respec-
tively, E(b1) + E(b2) is a ciphertext for the message b1 + b2. This means that
we can modify the function evaluation algorithm to add an encryption of the
zero message without hurting message recovery for injective branches, i.e. we
can use the function evaluation y = F (pk, b, (x, s¯, e¯)) = x · (pk− b) + (hs¯+ pe¯) =
h(xs+ s¯) + p(xe+ e¯) + x(b∗ − b), where hs¯+ pe¯ is a random ciphertext for the
zero message. Note that y is still an encryption of x(b∗ − b) as before, allowing
recovery of x by decryption for injective branches. But the additional random-
ness of s¯, e¯ masks the x-dependent terms xe and xs in y for evaluation of F on
the branch b = b∗, making this branch lossy, as required, assuming the masking
terms s¯, e¯ are sufficiently large. Of course, since F must be a deterministic al-
gorithm, the masking terms s¯, e¯ now become part of the function input (along
with x), and must be recoverable by the ABO's inversion algorithm F−1 for
injective branches b 6= b∗. For the latter, note that once x is recovered (by the
decryption algorithm), then we can recover the added ciphertext of zero, namely
y− x(pk− b) = hs¯+ pe¯ and use the randomness recovery algorithm of pNErr to
obtain s¯, e¯.
Construction. Our ABO construction FNTRU is shown in Fig. 4. We give con-
ditions for ABO inversion correctness in Lemma 7. Unlike Lemma 5 for pNErr,
which is only valid probabilistically over the randomness of the encryption al-
gorithm, our definition of ABO inversion correctness requires that, except for a
set of keys of negligible probability, inversion succeeds for all valid outputs of F.
This is used in the CCA security proof, to prevent attacks that choose outputs
that make the inversion fail in one game but not the other.
Lemma 7 (Inversion Correctness). If αq >
√
n, η < 1mnq , and q > max(p
2 ·
ω(n2
√
log n) ·αq · σ+ 2pp¯ ·n · σ+ p2 ·n2 · σ, p¯ ·n1.5 · σ) (resp. q > max(2p2 ·n2.5 ·
αq · σ + 2pp¯ · n · σ + p2 · n2 · σ, p¯ · n1.5 · σ)), then FNTRU satisfies n−ω(1)-Inversion
Correctness (resp. 2−Ω(n)-Inversion Correctness).
Proof. Any output y = F((h, c), b, (x, s¯, e¯)) of F has the form of a pNErr cipher-
text y = p · (hs′ + e′) + (b∗ − b)x for message (b∗ − b) · x, with s′ = sx + s¯
and e′ = ex + e¯ being the ciphertext randomness. By the choice of p and
Lemma 2, (b∗ − b)−1p exists. A sufficient condition for successful recovery of x is
that ‖C ′‖∞ < q/2, where C ′ = p(gs′ + fe′) + f(b∗ − b)x. The Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality gives ‖gs′‖∞ ≤ ‖g‖ · ‖s′‖. From Theorem 2, we have ‖g‖ ≤
√
nσ,
while Lemma 1 says that ‖sx‖ ≤ p · ω(n1.5√log n) · αq (resp. ‖sx‖ ≤ p · n2 · αq)
for every x ∈ Rp, except with probability ≤ n−ω(1) (resp. ≤ 2−Ω(n)) over the
choice of s during key generation. Since ‖s¯‖ ≤ √np¯, it follows that ‖pgs′‖∞ ≤
p2 ·ω(n2√log n) ·αq ·σ+pp¯ ·n ·σ (resp. ‖pgs′‖∞ ≤ p2 ·n2.5 ·αq ·σ+pp¯ ·n ·σ). The
same argument gives the same bound on ‖pfe′‖∞. Finally, applying Cauchy-
Schwarz again, we have ‖f(b∗ − b)x‖∞ ≤
√
n · ‖f‖ · ‖b∗ − b‖ · ‖x‖ ≤ p2 · n2 · σ.
This implies ‖C ′‖∞ < q/2 by the assumed lower bound on q.
The inversion algorithm succeeds to recover (s¯, e¯) if ‖T · [e¯, s¯]T ‖∞ = ‖[fe¯ +
gs¯, F e¯+Gs¯]T ‖∞ < q/2 and η < 1mnq . Using the bounds ‖f‖, ‖g‖, ‖F‖, ‖G‖ ≤ nσ
from Theorem 2, and ‖e¯‖, ‖s¯‖ ≤ p¯√n, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives
‖fe¯ + gs¯‖∞, ‖F e¯ + Gs¯‖∞ ≤ p¯n1.5σ < q/2, by the assumed condition on q,
as required. uunionsq
• Key generation KGFNTRU : Given as input 1n, primes q, p, integer p¯ and reals
α, σ, η and b∗ ∈ B (where B = {b ∈ Rp : deg(b) < n/2} denotes the branch
space), run the key generation algorithm of pNErr on input (1n, q, p, σ, α, ρ)
to obtain a public key h = gf−1 ∈ R×q and a secret key (f, F, T˜ ) for pNErr.
Return pk = (h, c = p·(hs+e)+b∗ ∈ Rq), where s, e←↩ χα and sk = (f, F, T˜ ).
• Evaluation algorithm F: Given as input public key pk = (h, c) ∈ R2q ,
branch b ∈ B and function input (x, s¯, e¯) ∈ X (where X = Rp ×R2p¯ denotes
the input space), return y = F((h, c), b, (x, s¯, e¯)) = (c−b)·x+p·(hs¯+e¯) ∈ Rq.
• Inversion algorithm F−1: Given as input y ∈ Rq, b ∈ B and secret key
sk = (f, F, T̂ ):
• Use the decryption algorithm of pNErr to decrypt ciphertext y with
secret key f to recover message x ∈ Rp (i.e. compute y′ = f · y ∈ Rq
and x = (b∗ − b)−1p · f−1p · y′ mod p, where (b∗ − b)−1p and f−1p denote
multiplicative inverses of f and b∗ − b, respectively, in Rp).
• Compute y′′ = y − (c − b) · x ∈ Rq and use the randomness recovery
algorithm of pNErr to recover randomness (s¯, e¯) from ciphertext y′′ with
message 0 and secret key sk (i.e. compute te = fp
−1y′′ ∈ Rq and ts =
Fp−1y′′ ∈ Rq, [e¯, s¯]T = dT˜ · [te, ts]T c ∈ R2, where d·c denotes rounding
coordinate-wise to the nearest integers).
• Return (x, s¯, e¯).
Fig. 4. The ABO Lossy Trapdoor Function Family FNTRU(n, q, p, p¯, σ, α, η).
We now analyze the lossiness of FNTRU.
Lemma 8 (Lossiness). If p¯ > p · ω(n√log n) · αq (resp. p¯ > 2p · n1.5 · αq + 1),
then FNTRU satisfies ρ-Lossiness with failure probability n−ω(1) (resp. 2−Ω(n)),
with ρ ≤ log(4p¯2)log(pp¯2) .
Proof. For evaluation on the lossy branch b∗, the function output is h · (xs +
s¯) + p(xe + e¯). Hence the number of possible outputs N is upper bounded by
(2B+1)2n, where B is an upper bound on ‖xs+s¯‖∞ and ‖xe+e¯‖∞. By Lemma 1,
we have ‖xs‖∞ ≤ p · ω(n
√
log n) · αq (resp. ‖xs‖∞ ≤ p · n1.5 · αq) for all x ∈ Rp
except with probability ≤ n−ω(1) (resp. 2−Ω(n)) over the choice of s ←↩ χα in
key generation, and ‖s¯‖∞ ≤ p¯/2. The same bounds also hold for ‖xe‖∞ and
‖e¯‖∞, respectively. Using the condition on p¯, we have 2B + 1 ≤ p¯, and since
|X| = (pp¯2)n, we get the stated bound on ρ. uunionsq
Note that the bound on the leakage rate ρ of FNTRU in Lemma 8 is (since log p¯ >
log p+O(log n)) greater than 1− log p3 log p+O(logn) > 2/3.
The lossy branch hiding property follows directly from the IND-CPA security
of the underlying pNErr encryption scheme, which in turn is as hard as the Ring-
LWE problem, by Lemma 6.
Lemma 9 (Lossy Branch Hiding). If there exists an attack against the lossy
branch hiding of FNTRU that runs in time T and has distinguishing advantage ,
then there exists an IND-CPA attack against pNErr with run time T and success
probability at least 1/2 + /2.
4 The NTRUCCA Scheme
4.1 Generalized Peikert-Waters Construction
Outline. The Peikert-Waters construction [26] of IND-CCA2 encryption from
ABO lossy trapdoor functions uses a pair of ABO lossy trapdoor functions F1
and F2
5. The ciphertext contains F1(b, x) and F2(b, x) for a random x that is
hashed to obtain a key with which to mask the message. The security proof relies
on the assumption that for the lossy branch b = b∗, the pair (F1(b∗, x), F2(b∗, x))
does not leak all the information on x. If both F1 and F2 have leakage rate ρ on
their lossy branch b∗, then the leakage rate of the pair (F1(b∗, x), F2(b∗, x)) is at
most 2ρ, so to ensure that not all the information on x is leaked, we must have
ρ < 1/2. Unfortunately, the leakage rate of our ABO FNTRU is greater than 2/3,
so FNTRU cannot be directly used in this construction.
Instead, we show that the Peikert-Waters construction generalizes to
use ciphertexts containing k ≥ 2 ABO evaluations F (k)(x1, . . . , xk) def=
(F1(b, x1), . . . , Fk(b, xk)), where F1, . . . , Fk denote k ABO functions, and the
evaluation points (x1, . . . , xk) sampled from a (k−1)-of-k Subset Reconstructible
Distribution (SRDk−1,k), in which any subset of k − 1 of the xi's suffices to
uniquely reconstruct all xi's (the Peikert-Waters construction corresponds to
the case k = 2). The advantage of using the SRDk−1,k distribution for k > 2, as
first observed by Mol and Yilek [22], is that the min-entropy of the SRDk−1,k
distribution when sampled with a Reed-Solomon code is (k−1) log |X| versus the
≤ kρ log |X| leaked min-entropy, implying that the leakage rate of F (k) on the
lossy branch b = b∗ with input distribution SRDk−1,k is ρ(k) ≤ kk−1 ·ρ. Hence by
using a sufficiently large k, one can make ρ(k) exceed ρ by an arbitrarily small
amount. In particular, starting with ρ ≈ 2/3 as in our ABO, a constant k ≥ 4
suffices for our scheme, so the ciphertext length only incurs a constant factor
overhead over the length of a single ABO output (which corresponds to a single
NTRU ciphertext).
We remark that Mol and Yilek applied the k-product one-way function F (k)
to the IND-CCA2 encryption scheme of Rosen and Segev [30], that requires F (k)
to be one-way under the SRDk−1,k distribution. The advantage of our gener-
alized Peikert-Waters scheme over Rosen-Segev when the underlying functions
Fi are lossy, is that in our scheme the only lower bound constraint on k comes
from the requirement that F (k) is lossy (which for our ABO FNTRU, can be sat-
isfied with a constant k = O(1)), whereas in the Rosen-Segev scheme, k is also
lower bounded by the security parameter (because in Rosen-Segev, k is lower
bounded by the public key length of a one-time signature scheme, or at least
the length of a collision-resistant hash of the public key). Thus, starting from
ρ-lossy ABO functions Fi, our generalized Peikert-Waters scheme yields shorter
ciphertexts than Rosen-Segev by a factor Ω((1 − ρ) · n), where n denotes the
security parameter.
5 Actually only F2 needs to be an ABO lossy trapdoor function, whereas F1 can be
just a plain lossy trapdoor function.
Construction. Figure 5 shows our generalized Peikert-Waters scheme GPWk,
parameterized by an integer k. We use an ABO lossy trapdoor function family
F = (KGF ,F,F−1) with function input space X and branch space B, which
is ρ-lossy. As in the Peikert-Waters scheme, we also use a strongly unforgeable
one-time signature scheme OTS = (OTS.KG,OTS.Sign,OTS.Ver) with public
key space P . We assume for convenience that P ∪ {b0} ⊆ B, for some branch
b0 6∈ P (if |P | > |B|, we can hash a key in P into P ′ ⊂ B using a collision-
resistant hash function). We also use a family H of universal hash functions
from Xk to {0, 1}`. We assume that we have efficient algorithms Sampk−1,k and
Reck−1,k for, respectively, sampling from the distribution SRDk−1,k over Xk,
and reconstructing xj from {xi}i6=j for any (x1, . . . , xk) output by Sampk−1,k
and any j ∈ [k], and that the min-entropy of SRDk−1,k is µ ≥ (k − 1) logX (as
mentioned above, the latter assumption can be satisfied using Shamir's secret
sharing scheme [22]).
Key generation. Given input parameters 1n and k, run algorithm KGF k times
on input (1n, b0) to get k independent key pairs (pki, ski) (i ∈ [k]) for ABO lossy
trapdoor function family F , all having lossy branch b0. Sample a hash function
h ←↩ H. Return key pair (pk, sk) with secret key sk = (sk1, . . . , skk−1) and
public key pk = (pk1, . . . , pkk, h).
Encryption. Given public key pk = (pk1, . . . , pkk, h) and message M ∈ {0, 1}`,
run OTS.KG to generate a one-time signature key pair (skS , pkS). Sample
(x1, . . . , xk) = Sampk−1,k and for i ∈ [k], compute yi = F(pki, pkS , xi) (i.e.
use branch pkS for all k evaluations). Compute C = M ⊕ h(x1, . . . , xk), and
σ = Sign(skS , (y1, . . . , yk, C)). Return ciphertext c = (pkS , y1, . . . , yk, C, σ).
Decryption. Given ciphertext c = (pkS , y1, . . . , yk, C, σ) and secret key sk =
(sk1, . . . , skk−1), check that OTS.Ver(pkS , (y1, . . . , yk, C), σ) = Acc. If not, re-
turn ⊥. Compute xi = F−1(ski, pkS , yi) for i ∈ [k − 1]. Compute xk =
Reck−1,k(x1, . . . , xk−1). If xi ∈ X and F(pki, pkS , xi) = yi for all i ∈ [k] then
return M = C ⊕ h(x1, . . . , xk). Else, return ⊥.
Fig. 5. The generalized Peikert-Waters encryption scheme GPWk.
The security of the scheme is summarized by Theorem 3, a quantitative
generalization of Theorem 4.2 in [26] (the latter is the special case k = 2).
Theorem 3. Suppose there exists an IND-CCA2 attack A against the GPWk
encryption scheme of Fig. 5, that runs in time T and has success probability
1/2 + ε, F satisfies δ-correctness and ρ-lossiness, the min-entropy µ ≥ (k − 1) ·
log |X|, and k ≥ 11−ρ ·
(
1 + 2n+`log |X|
)
. Let ε′ = ε− 2kδ − 2−n. Then, at least one
of the following attacks exist:
 An attack As against the strong existential unforgeability of OTS with run-
time Ts = T and success probability εs ≥ ε′k+1 .
 An attack Ah against the lossy branch hiding property of F , with run-time
Th = T and distinguishing advantage εh ≥ ε′k+1 .
A Simpler IND-CCA2 KEM. For encrypting long messages efficiently, one
typically uses a hybrid IND-CCA2 encryption scheme, combining an IND-CCA2
Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) with an efficient IND-CCA2 symmetric
encryption scheme [6]. The encryption algorithm of a KEM takes as input the
public key and a security parameter, and returns a uniformly random key K
in the key space {0, 1}` and ciphertext c for K. The above construction can
be simplified in the KEM setting, replacing the one-time signature scheme in
the above scheme by a collision-resistant hash function family G mapping Xk
to BG ⊆ B, i.e. the branch pkS encryption is replaced by b = g(x1, . . . , xk)
where g ∈ G is the hash function in the public key. The decryption algorithm
checks that b = g(x1, . . . , xk) (here X and B denote the input and branch space,
respectively, of the ABO lossy trapdoor function family). The security result is
only slightly modified to account for the extra leakage by b on (x1, . . . , xk). We
call the resulting scheme GPWKEMk (see full paper for a detailed definition).
Theorem 4. Suppose there exists an IND-CCA2 attack A against the GPWKEMk
KEM that runs in time T and has success probability 1/2 + ε, F satisfies δ-
correctness and ρ-lossiness, µ ≥ (k−1)·log |X|, and k ≥ 11−ρ ·
(
1 + 2n+`+log |BG |log |X|
)
.
Let ε′ = ε− 2kδ − 2−n. Then, at least one of the following attacks exist:
 An attack Ac against the collision-resistance of hash family G with run-time
Tc = T and success probability εc ≥ ε′k+1 .
 An attack Ah against the lossy branch hiding property of F , with run-time
Th = T and distinguishing advantage εh ≥ ε′k+1 .
4.2 Instantiation and Choice of Parameters
Our NTRUCCA scheme is defined as the GPWk scheme with the following instanti-
ation choices, in terms of n, the security parameter. We let ε, εp > 0 denote pos-
itive constants (independent of n) that one may adjust to trade-off the scheme's
concrete performance. The constant ε controls the uniformity of the NTRU key
h (its statistical distance from uniform over Rq is at most 2
3nq−ε·n, by Theo-
rem 2). The constant εp controls the size of the ABO branch space B (its size
is |B| = pn/2). The procedure we use for choosing parameters is as follows. We
choose αq = θ(n1.5) to satisfy worst-case reduction condition against 2o(n)-time
attacks, by Theorem 1. Next, setting p = nεp , we choose p¯ = p · ω(n1.5 log nαq),
the condition in lossiness Lemma 8. Then, we plug the condition on σ from Lem-
mas 9 and 6 in the condition on q from Lemma 7. This determines our choice of
q and σ and η, and then we can determine from αq and q the value of α−1 and
hence the resulting γ-Ideal-SVP approximation factor.
 ABO Trapdoor Function Family F :We use FNTRU(n, q, p, p¯, σ, α, η) from
Sec. 3.2 with the following parameters:
• q = Θ˜
(
n
max(5.5+εp,5+2εp)
1/2−2ε
)
, p = nεp , p¯ = Θ˜
(
n3+εp
)
.
• σ = Θ˜
(
n1+max(5.5+εp,5+2εp)·
1/2+2ε
1/2−2ε
)
.
• α−1 = Θ˜
(
n
max(5.5+εp,5+2εp)
1/2−2ε −1.5
)
.
• η−1 = Θ˜(nq).
Note that this choice of parameters implies:
• FNTRU leakage rate, ρ ≤ 1− 1−
2
log p
1+2 log p¯log p
≤ 1− 1
3+6ε−1p +o(1)
(By Lemma 8).
• FNTRU input entropy, log |X| = n·(log p+2 log p¯) = (3εp+6+o(1))·n log n.
• k =
⌈
3 + ε−1p ·
(
6 + 2+`/nlogn
)
+ o(1)
⌉
. (k = 4 is possible with ` = θ(n log n)).
• Worst-Case IdSVP Approximation Factor, γ = O(n2.5α−1).
 One-Time Signature Scheme OTS: We use the One-Time Signature
scheme of [18]. It operates on vectors of dimension mots ≥ 2 over the ring
Rqots = Zqots [x]/(xnots+1), with a public key of length (mots+2) ·nots log qots
and a signature of length ≤ mots · nots log qots. We instantiate it with:
• mots = 2.
• qots = Θ(n5ots log5+ε
′
nots).
• Worst-case IdSVP Approximation Factor, γots = O(n4ots log3 nots).
• nots ≤ n log p8 log qots = Θ(n). (Note this implies that the verification key
length is ≤ B).
 Universal Hash Family H:We use a random linear mapping fromGF (2`)k′
to GF (2`), where:
• k′ = log |X|` = O(1). (This means that the key length of H is O(n log n)
and evaluating it costs O˜(k′`) = O˜(n) time).
 Sampk−1,k and Reck−1,k: We use three Reed-Solomon codes (one overGF (p
n)
and two over GF (p¯n)) to implement Sampk−1,k for encoding x ∈ Rp and
s¯, e¯ ∈ Rp¯, and we use Lagrange interpolation to implement Reck−1,k. Both
can be done in time O˜(n).
Overall, we obtain our main asymptotic result.
Corollary 1. If there exists an attack against the IND-CCA2 security of
NTRUCCA with run-time T = 2o(n) and success probability 2−o(n), then there
exists a quantum algorithm with run-time 2o(n) against the γ-IdSVP problem
with γ = Θ˜
(
n1+
max(5.5+εp,5+2εp)
1/2−2ε
)
. The scheme has key and ciphertext size of
O(n log n) and encryption and decryption computation time of O˜(n).
Note that with the current state of the art, the best quantum attack against
Poly(n)-IdSVP takes time 2Ω(n), so with this assumption, the above results says
that for any constant 0 < ε < 1/2, and εp > 0, the time required to break the
IND-CCA2 security of NTRUCCA is 2Ω(n).
5 Conclusions
We constructed the first asymptotically efficient IND-CCA2 secure variant of
the NTRUEncrypt encryption scheme, with a provable security from worst-case
problems in ideal lattices. Although the efficiency overhead of our scheme over
the IND-CPA scheme of [34]) amounts to only a constant factor, this factor
could in practice be quite significant. An interesting direction for future work
is to construct provably secure variants of NTRUEncrypt which have a smaller
constant overhead factor close to 1 (as well as reducing the constant overhead
of [34] over the original heuristic NTRUEncrypt scheme).
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